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Introduction
The Investment Dartboard is a monthly feature of the Wall Street Journal (WSJ).  Each month,
four professional stock pickers each select a stock they expect to perform best over the next six months.
Four stocks are also chosen at random by throwing darts at the stock listings from the WSJ.  At the end of
the six-month contest period, the performances of the pros are compared with the darts.  The contest uses a
rolling six-month time frame for analysis.
Several researchers have conducted abnormal returns on the announcement of an analyst’s
recommendation.  Many of these researchers concluded that it is in the best interest of investors to follow
the advice of analysts.  Bjerring, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1983) concluded that investors following the
advice of a leading Canadian brokerage house would have earned positive abnormal returns after allowing
for transaction costs.  Studies on abnormal returns conducted by Liu, Smith, & Syed (1990) and Davies &
Canes (1978) result in the same conclusion.
Barber and Loeffler (hereafter BL) (1983) addressed factors that drive abnormal performances
associated with analysts’ recommendations.  They presented key characteristics of the Pros’ Picks, the
Dartboard Stocks, the S&P 500, and NYSE Firms for the WSJ Investment Dartboard. They found that the
Pros’ Picks are approximately the same size as the Dartboard Stocks and the median size of the NYSE
firms. The Pros’ Picks, however, have substantially lower dividend yields, substantially higher historic and
projected EPS growth, and slightly higher PE ratios and betas.  It is further stated that the differences were
caused by selection biases professional analysts have when selecting stocks1.  However, BL stated that
differences in dividend yields, historic and projected EPS growth, PE ratios, and betas offer no reason in
predicting abnormal performance of the Pros’ Picks relative to the Dartboard Stocks or market averages.
BL tested for price and volume pressure around the announcement date of the new professional picks.
They find an average abnormal return of 3.53% on the announcement day, as well as higher than expected
trading volume.  They attribute their findings to naive buying pressure as well as information content in the
analysts' recommendations.
We extend the BL results by splitting the sample of stock chosen by the professionals.  Each
month, the two analysts from the previous (i.e., six months prior) contest with the highest return are invited
back (we label them "winners"), and are accompanied by two new contestants ("contenders").   Since BL
attribute the excess returns observed to investors buying on the basis of professionals' recommendations,
                                                       
1 Professional analysts have a tendency to pick high growth firms with low dividend yields.  Capital appreciation
was used to measure performance in BL’s study making low yielding stocks a necessary criteria in picking stocks.
1we test whether investors place greater price and volume pressure on the stocks chosen by the proven
"winners" when compared to the unproven "contenders."
Data and Methodology
We collected the announcement date and recommendations of the winners and contenders for all
WSJ issues of 1990 and 1991.  Stocks not listed on the Compustat PC-Plus CD-ROM were deleted from
the sample.  The final sample consisted of thirty-seven winners' picks, and 53 contenders' picks.   Daily
closing prices and volumes were collected for each stock for a period from 120 days before the
announcement to 20 days after.
We used standard event study methodology, as surveyed and evaluated by Brown and Warner
(1985), to test for price pressure around the announcement.  For each stock, we estimated the market model
using days t=-120 to t=-20 relative to the announcement:
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where:
Ri,t = return on stock i, on day t
Rm,t = return on NYSE composite index on day t
Next, the parameters from the estimation period were used to calculate "abnormal returns" for days t=-20
to t=+20:
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where:
ARi,t = abnormal return for stock i, on day t
Ri,t = actual return for stock i, on day t
ERi,t   = expected return for stock i, on day t, given the parameters of the 
market model and the actual return on the NYSE index on that day.
For each group of stock pickers (i.e., winners and contenders) we calculate the average abnormal return for
days t=-20 to t=+20:
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To evaluate the total effect over time of the announcement, we also calculate the cumulative abnormal
return from days t=-20 to t=+20:
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2The test for volume effects is conducted using the technique of Allen and Thompson (1991).  For days t=-
40 to t=-21, the mean volume ratio is computed for each stock:
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where:
Vi,t = volume for stock i, on day t
Vm,t = NYSE composite volume on day t
We then calculate the relative volume ratio for each stock for days t=-20 to t=+20:
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Finally, we calculate the average relative volume ratio for each day for t=-20 to t=+20:
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Empirical Results
Table 1 presents the average abnormal returns around the announcement day for both groups.  For
the winners, we find an announcement day abnormal return of 3.28% (p<.001) for the winners, and 2.60%
(p<.001) for the contenders.  Table 2 presents the relative volume ratios around the announcement day for
both groups.  For the winners, the announcement day RVR is 2.50 (p=.05) for the winners, and 1.98
(p=.19) for the contenders.  These results indicate that investors place greater price and volume pressure on
the stock chosen by returning winners than on those stocks chosen by the new contender.
To test whether the winners’ performance in the last contest has an effect on the announcement day
abnormal return in the new contest, we perform the following regression:
AR TRj o j, = +g g0 1
where:
ARj,0 = the announcement day abnormal return for the pick of winner j
TRj = the return for the pick of winner j in the last contest.
The estimated equation is:
ARj,0 = .021676 + .0311* TRj R2 = 0.0481
where:
3* indicates the parameter is significant at the .10 level.
This result strengthens the price and volume pressure findings.  Investors place more price pressure on the
winners’ stocks, with the amount of pressure increasing the better that contestant did in the previous
contest.
Graph 1 shows the cumulative abnormal return for each group around the announcement day.  For
the returning winners, the CAR is about 7% the day after publication.  For the contenders, the CAR is only
4% by the day after publication.  However, for both groups, the CAR falls back to near zero by 20 trading
days after the publication date.  This indicates that the price pressure observed is due to naive buying by
investors reading the column, and not due to information contained in the analysts recommendations.
Graph 2 shows the relative volume ratio for each group around the announcement day.  Again, we
see that investors buy more of the stock recommended by the returning winner than by the new contender in
the two-day window following publication.  After this time period, neither group exhibits any abnormal
trading volume.
Summary and Conclusion
The purpose of this paper is to test whether investors place greater price and volume pressure on the stocks
chosen by the proven winners when compared to the unproven “contenders”.  The abnormal returns
indicate that investors did place greater price pressure on the stocks chosen by the “winners” compared to
the “contenders”.  The observed run up in the CAR of “winners” picks before the announcement date may
be caused by the analysts making recommendations to their own clients before announcement.  The wealth
increase for both the “winners” and “contenders” is not permanent.  Rather it decreases to near the pre-
event level by the twentieth day after the announcement.  This finding indicates that the price pressure is
due to naive buying rather than new information being revealed.  The tests on relative volume ratio show
that investors placed greater emphasis on the “winners” recommendations versus the recommendations of
the “contenders.”  Finally, we show that the amount of price pressure observed increases with the success
of the winner in the previous contest.
4References
Ajinkya, B. B. and Jain, P. C. “The  Behavior of Daily Stock Market Trading Volume.” Journal of
Accounting and Economics. Vol.11 1989. Pages 331-359.
Allen, D. S. and Thompson, G. R. “Pre-Announcement of Changes in the S&P 500 Index: Tests for Price
and Volume Pressure.” Financial Management, Vol.20 No.4, Winter 1991. Pages 7-8.
Barber, R. M.  and Loeffler, D. “The “Dartboard” Column: Second-Hand Information and Price Pressure.”
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol.28 No. 2, June 1993. Pages 273-284.
Bjerring, J. H.; Lakonishok J; and Vermaelen T. “Stock Prices and Financial Analysts’
Recommendations.” Journal of Finance, Vol. 38 March 1983. Pages 187-204.
Brown, S. J. and Warner, J. B. “Using Daily Stock Returns: The Case of Event Studies.” Journal of
Financial Economics, Vol.14 1985. Pages 3-31.
Davis, P. L. and Canes, M. “Stock Prices and the Publication of Second-Hand Information.” Journal of
Business, Vol.51 1978. Pages 43-56
Huth, W. L. and Maris, B. A. “Large and Small Firm Stock Price Response to “Heard on the Street”
Recommendations.”Journal of Accounting, Auditing, and Finance,  Vol. NS7, Winter 1992.
Pages 27-47.
Kritzman, Mark. P. “What Practitioners Need To Know: About Event Studies.” Financial Analysts
Journal, November-December 1994. Pages 17-20.
Liu, P; S. D. Smith & A. A. Syed. “Stock Price Reactions to The Wall Street Journal’s Securities
Recommendations.” Journal of Financial & Quantitative Analysis, Sep 25, 1990. Pages 399-410.
Pari, R. A. “Wall $treet Week Recommendations: Yes or No?” Journal of Portfolio Management, Vol. 13
Fall 1987. Pages 74-76.
5Table 1: Abnormal Returns
Winners Contenders
Day AR P AR P
-20 1.51% 0.005 -0.55% 0.225
-19 0.33% 0.513 -0.06% 0.889
-18 -0.69% 0.175 0.26% 0.561
-17 -0.07% 0.887 0.14% 0.757
-16 -0.78% 0.129 -0.03% 0.939
-15 0.63% 0.216 0.47% 0.297
-14 -0.02% 0.965 -0.18% 0.689
-13 -0.13% 0.800 0.26% 0.562
-12 0.56% 0.271 -0.11% 0.803
-11 -0.83% 0.110 0.37% 0.411
-10 -0.48% 0.341 0.23% 0.607
-9 0.34% 0.499 -0.80% 0.081
-8 0.58% 0.259 -0.07% 0.883
-7 -0.40% 0.433 -0.32% 0.475
-6 0.14% 0.786 -0.04% 0.925
-5 0.73% 0.155 0.50% 0.271
-4 0.67% 0.190 0.05% 0.918
-3 -0.36% 0.484 -0.12% 0.798
-2 1.02% 0.049 0.21% 0.647
-1 -0.13% 0.792 0.22% 0.628
0 3.28% 0.000 2.60% 0.000
1 1.19% 0.023 0.89% 0.052
2 -0.26% 0.614 -0.05% 0.908
3 -0.41% 0.425 0.31% 0.493
4 -1.67% 0.002 -0.04% 0.932
5 -0.41% 0.424 -0.42% 0.357
6 -0.43% 0.397 -1.03% 0.025
7 -0.50% 0.326 -0.63% 0.165
8 0.20% 0.689 -0.52% 0.250
9 0.15% 0.763 -0.05% 0.904
10 -0.35% 0.484 0.23% 0.609
11 0.06% 0.901 -0.45% 0.321
12 -0.40% 0.428 -0.15% 0.736
13 -0.51% 0.314 -0.34% 0.445
14 -0.48% 0.348 -0.05% 0.912
15 0.38% 0.455 0.33% 0.465
16 0.72% 0.161 0.31% 0.488
17 0.06% 0.912 -0.01% 0.989
18 -0.29% 0.570 -0.18% 0.687
19 -0.70% 0.176 -0.38% 0.398
20 -0.85% 0.098 -0.12% 0.792
6Table 2: Relative Volume Ratio
Winners Contenders
Day RVR P RVR P
-20 1.67 0.000 0.96 0.786
-19 1.87 0.000 0.99 0.932
-18 1.30 0.085 0.97 0.843
-17 1.02 0.930 1.02 0.881
-16 0.91 0.585 0.94 0.679
-15 1.05 0.752 0.85 0.296
-14 1.01 0.962 1.26 0.068
-13 0.96 0.818 1.05 0.744
-12 0.96 0.833 1.27 0.060
-11 1.04 0.822 1.32 0.025
-10 1.02 0.909 1.13 0.364
-9 0.92 0.646 0.98 0.857
-8 1.02 0.887 1.05 0.702
-7 0.94 0.718 1.04 0.798
-6 1.11 0.533 1.31 0.029
-5 0.96 0.798 1.33 0.020
-4 1.18 0.298 1.34 0.016
-3 1.42 0.020 1.24 0.085
-2 1.30 0.086 1.03 0.847
-1 1.31 0.075 1.17 0.221
0 2.49 0.000 1.83 0.000
1 2.09 0.000 2.11 0.000
2 1.58 0.002 1.39 0.007
3 1.24 0.176 1.64 0.000
4 1.17 0.315 1.09 0.513
5 1.15 0.375 1.17 0.230
6 1.34 0.055 0.97 0.836
7 0.93 0.699 1.27 0.059
8 1.05 0.771 1.02 0.863
9 0.93 0.700 1.05 0.716
10 0.94 0.747 1.06 0.660
11 1.18 0.292 1.03 0.802
12 1.01 0.932 1.09 0.538
13 1.20 0.258 1.08 0.561
14 1.06 0.736 0.87 0.365
15 1.29 0.098 1.02 0.898
16 1.19 0.266 1.26 0.069
17 1.31 0.079 0.97 0.837
18 1.29 0.095 1.07 0.639
19 1.28 0.112 1.16 0.255
20 1.01 0.936 1.11 0.410
7Graph 1: Cumulative Abnormal Returns
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Graph 2: Relative Volume Ratios
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